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Racial inequality and the implementation of emergency management laws in economically 
distressed urban areas  
Shawna J. Lee, Amy Krings,, Sara Rose, Krista Dover, Jessica Ayoub, Fatima Salman
 
 
Abbreviations: ACS, American Community Survey; CBA, Community Benefits Agreement; 
EM, emergency management; US, United States.  
 
Abstract  
This study examines the use of emergency management laws as a policy response to fiscal 
emergencies in urban areas. Focusing on one Midwestern Rust Belt state, we use a mixed 
methods approach – integrating chronology of legislative history, analysis of Census data, 
and an ethnographic case study – to examine the dynamics of emergency management laws 
from a social justice perspective. Analysis of Census data showed that emergency 
management policies disproportionately affected African Americans and poor families. 
Analysis indicated that in one state, 51% of African American residents and 16.6% of 
Hispanic or Latinos residents had lived in cities that were under the governance of an 
emergency manager at some time during 2008–2013, whereas only 2.4% of the White 
population similarly had lived in cities under emergency management. An ethnographic 
case study high- lights the mechanisms by which an emergency manager hindered the 
ability of residents in one urban neighbor- hood, expected to host a large public works 
project, to obtain a Community Benefits Agreement intended to provide assistance to 
residents, most of whom were poor families with young children. We conclude with a 
discussion of how emergency management laws may impact social service practice and 
policy practice in urban communities, framed from a social justice perspective. We argue 
that these are not race neutral policies, given clear evidence of race and ethnic disparities 
in their implementation.  
 
  
1. Introduction 
The 2007–2009 economic recession was a period of fiscal crisis that deeply affected state 
and local governments across the country. Governments responded to revenue loss and 
poor economic conditions through various austerity measures, among them raising taxes, 
reducing or privatizing public services, declaring bankruptcy, or implementing some form 
of state receivership (Anderson, 2011; Anderson, 2012; Bowman, 2013; Coe, 2008; Kimhi, 
2008). This article analyzes the increasing use of emergency management (EM) laws to 
respond to fiscal crises and demonstrates how EM laws can have down- stream impacts on 
the health and wellbeing of children and families. Most commonly, EM laws are passed by 
state legislatures. When a municipal-level fiscal emergency arises, EM laws permit state 
officials, such as the governor, to appoint a receiver, state agency, or financial control board 
to oversee local (city) government. In some cases, these laws shift decision-making 
authority from local elected officials, such as a mayor, city council, or school board, to a 
single non-elected state appointee, called an emergency manager. Emergency managers 
often have considerable autonomy over fiscal decisions and can play a pivotal role in 
developing and implementing new financial and operations plans for the city (Anderson, 
2012; Loh, 2015). This paper discusses the implementation of EM laws within the State of 
Michigan, in part because Michigan has used EM laws more extensively than any other 
state. Beginning in 2008, 10 cities in Michigan were under emergency management and 
had an emergency manger in place (see Table 1).  
In this paper, we begin by situating EM laws within a broader philosophy of austerity 
politics. We discuss how EM reduces opportunities for local democratic decision-making as 
well as public investment. We present analysis of Census data that shows that poor 
individuals and racial minorities live under EM more often than more affluent or white 
residents. Thus, less powerful groups absorb the costs of EM. We conclude with a case 
study that describes the mechanics through which EM minimizes local accountability and, 
ultimately, the provision of public services. We argue that these laws influence the 
wellbeing of children and families, particularly within economically distressed urban areas, 
in ways that are problematic and, for the most part, have been ignored.  
 
1.1. Background: the logic and scope of emergency management policy  
Cities in America's Rust Belt, a region that encompasses Midwestern states such as 
Michigan, continue to grapple with prolonged economic stagnation and decline that stem 
from business loss and relocation, among other factors (Alder, Lagakos, & Ohanian, 2014). 
In the seminal book on the Origins of the Urban Crisis, Sugrue (2005) demonstrates how 
industrialized cities, such as Detroit, were especially hard hit after corporate decisions to 
relocate plants and to automate production shrank industrial employment. The impact of 
employment loss was especially devastating for African Americans because historical 
redlining policies restricted financial lending on the basis of race, and restrictive covenants 
forbade the sale of homes to racial minorities. These factors contributed to highly 
segregated neighborhoods and lack of geographic mobility for the African American 
community in particular. Other policies that subsidized the construction of interstates and 
residential suburbs incentivized continued white flight away from urban areas thus further 
isolating communities of color, particularly low-income individuals, in urban areas (Massey 
& Denton, 1993; Sugrue, 2005). Thus, at the same time that racial minorities began to gain 
political power in urban areas, their access to financial resources declined. In many Rust 
Belt cities these changes, combined with ongoing reductions in federal and state revenue-
sharing with municipalities and the recent housing fore- closure crisis (Coe, 2008; Kasdan, 
2016; Scorsone, 2014), have culminated to create severe, multifaceted municipal economic 
crises that local leaders found difficult to manage via available policy mechanisms (e.g., 
raising taxes).  
The use of EM laws to respond to financial crises is not a new phenomenon; it began during 
the Great Depression. In fact, EM laws are relatively common: At least 16 states have some 
form of EM mechanism, among them Rhode Island, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, and Ohio 
(Scorsone, 2014). Recently the Governor of New Jersey appointed an EM to address a fiscal 
crisis in Atlantic City, New Jersey (McGeehan, 2015). Several states have special legislation 
that addresses state intervention in a local fiscal crisis on a case-by-case basis (Anderson, 
2012; Scorsone, 2014). Scorsone (2014) discusses in detail the economic factors that 
activate EM laws. Broadly, these laws may come into effect when a city is at risk of 
defaulting on debt or pension payments or has insufficient cash to make payroll or bond 
payments (Scorsone, 2014). The solution to such financial emergencies focuses upon the 
alleviation of fiscal problems through a reduction in local spending, implemented by a 
state-appointed emergency manager. Structural problems, such as the loss of revenue 
through the declines in tax base, population, state revenue sharing, and industrial 
unemployment, are largely ignored (Fasenfest & Pride, 2016).  
Though EM laws are not a recent development, they are prompting new questions about 
appropriate policy responses to financial emergencies in distressed urban areas (Anderson, 
2012; Scorsone, 2014; Skidmore & Scorsone, 2011). The attainment of social justice 
requires both a fair process in which the people who are impacted by policy have influence 
in shaping it as well as the fair distribution of resources (Reisch & Garvin, 2016). Using a 
social justice perspective, we summarize some of the critiques of EM laws and processes.  
Procedurally, key components of economic restructuring under EM laws may involve 
development and implementation of a new financial and operations plan without requiring 
democratic consent from, or consultation with, the public or its elected officials (Anderson, 
2012; Loh, 2015). Thus, some argue that EM laws reflect undemocratic processes that 
privilege a market-oriented logic that uses technocratic, “expert”- driven (i.e., the state-
appointed emergency manager) decision-making processes, as opposed to decisions 
reached by democratically elected city government officials, who are often local residents 
and at a mini- mum are accountable to local residents through the democratic voting 
process (Lewis, 2013). Many question whether it is fair for states to use power to strip 
mayors and city councils of most of their governing power, as often occurs when EM laws 
are in effect. Loh (2015) describes EM laws in Michigan as an “unprecedented interruption 
of elected city government” (pg. 2). In addition, there are concerns that an emergency 
manager is able to renegotiate, terminate, or modify labor contracts, thus potentially 
weakening the influence of organized labor (Lewis, 2013).  
Distributionally, EM laws require cuts to public expenses in order to balance city budgets. 
Perhaps the most extreme example of this approach came to light in 2015 as a result of the 
Flint water crisis. In the Flint case, an emergency manager switched the city's water source 
from the Detroit-supplied Lake Huron pipeline to an alternative water source supplied by 
the Flint River—a cost-saving measure that culminated in contaminated water and even 
lead poisoning among the people of Flint (Hanna-Attisha, LaChance, Sadler, & Schnepp, 
2016). Despite protests from residents, the emergency manager would not allow the City to 
switch back to the Detroit water source, citing, among other factors, the financial costs of 
doing so.  
 
1.2. Study rationale  
Embedded in a social justice perspective and using a mixed methods methodology, the 
present study examines the dynamics of EM laws, focusing—for several reasons—on their 
implementation in Michigan. Michigan has used EM laws to respond to fiscal crises more 
extensively than any other state; starting in 2008, 10 Michigan cities were placed under 
emergency management (see Table 1). Though many states use some form of EM in times 
of fiscal crises, Scorsone (2014), pg. 5 notes that Michigan has been widely scrutinized for 
“being among the nation's most aggressive in granting extensive powers to an emergency 
manager.” Michigan's extensive use of EM laws enabled the research team to examine use 
of EM laws through multiple lenses (e.g., historically, quantitatively, and ethnographically), 
described in the Method section below. In so doing, this study sheds light on the political 
processes that gave rise to implementation of EM laws in urban areas in Michigan as well 
as race and ethnic disparities in the impacts of the EM law.  
 
2. Method  
Our mixed methods approach utilizes historical policy data gathered from the state of 
Michigan, analysis of U.S. Census and American Com- munity Survey (ACS) data, and a 
qualitative case study of a neighbor- hood community organization in one Detroit 
neighborhood. We first compiled a chronology of legislative processes that documents the 
legislative history of EM laws in Michigan from the mid-1980s to the present. Then, we 
identified 12 Michigan municipalities that have had at least one emergency manager since 
1988; several cities have had multiple emergency managers operating at different time 
points (e.g., Ecorse, Hamtramck, Highland Park and Flint) (see Table 1). We used data 
gathered by the U.S. Census Bureau and the ACS to examine the demographic 
characteristics of cities under EM, mainly focusing on racial and ethnic groups and family 
poverty, to better understand who is most impacted by EM laws.  
To complement our historical chronology and quantitative data, we present an 
ethnographic case study that examines how the dynamics of political decision-making in 
Detroit changed while under EM, thereby limiting local influence. The case involves a 
grassroots community organization based in the low-income, industrialized southwest 
Detroit neighborhood of Delray. Data presented in this case study were collected as part of 
a broader research project conducted during 2011–2014 and used participant observation, 
interviews (n = 77) with residents, elected officials, social service providers, and lobbyists, 
as well as media content analysis. Neither the larger community case study nor the 
community-based campaign was originally focused on the issue of emergency 
management. However, as the campaign progressed, the state financial takeover of Detroit 
resulted in (perhaps unintended) consequences that further constrained residents' 
political influence, effectively blocking their ability to secure local investments that would 
mitigate environmental health impacts within the host neighborhood. See Krings (2015) 
for more information on the case and its methodology.  
 
3. Results  
3.1. Emergency management legislation in Michigan: chronology of legislation  
The EM system permits state-appointed officials to replace local elected officials, such as 
city councils or mayors, and to have widespread fiscal authority with limited connection to 
residents. In this section, we provide a brief policy history of Michigan's Local Financial 
Stability and Choice Act of 2012 (Public Act 436; Mich. Comp. Laws § 141.1541- 141.1575) 
– better known as the EM law.  
In the state of Michigan, legislation that allows the use of state power to intervene during 
times of fiscal crises dates from the 1960s. The more immediate predecessor of the current 
EM law is the 1988 Local Government Fiscal Responsibility Act or Public Act 101 of 1988 
(PA 101, repealed 1990; Mich Comp. Laws § 141.1101-141.1118). PA 101 provided the 
structure that allowed the state to intervene when local municipalities were found to be in 
financial distress. PA 101 included language that allowed for the governor to assign a local 
emergency financial man- ager. This law defined the financial conditions that would trigger 
state intervention.  
PA 101 was followed by the Local Government Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1990 or Public 
Act 72 (PA 72, repealed 2012; Mich Comp. Laws § 141.1201-141.1291). PA 72 expanded 
the scope of EM laws and allowed for state receivership to include public school districts 
(Bowman, 2013). PA 72 allowed EMs to control financial decisions, for example, revising 
and creating city budgets and approving spending decisions. Although EMs had 
considerable fiscal responsibility under PA 72, governance remained in the hands of local 
elected officials.  
The Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act of 2011 (Public Act 4; 
Mich Comp. Laws § 141.1501-141.1531) became Michigan's third municipal takeover 
statute (Bowman, 2013). This legislative effort expanded EM powers beyond financial 
decision-making. As such, the title was shifted from “emergency financial manager” to 
“emergency manager” (Bowman, 2013). The title change reflects the expansion of EM 
powers and shift from emergency financial manager to simply an emergency manager. 
Under PA 4, emergency managers were able to modify collective bargaining agreements, 
suspend collecting bargaining for up to five years, remove pension board members, and 
other changes (Arsen & Mason, 2013; Bowman, 2013). Furthermore, PA 4 granted the state 
governor further autonomy in appointing an EM, allowing for the appointment of EMs 
“without the advice and consent of the senate and without input required from other 
government officials, elected or appointed” (Bowman, 2013, pg. 7).  
PA 4 was passed by the Michigan State Legislature and signed by the governor in six weeks, 
largely eliminating the potential for voter input. Following its passage, citizens circulated a 
petition to repeal PA 4 as a referendum on the state ballot. PA 4 was rejected by voters and 
repealed by popular vote in the General Election of 2012 (Bowman, 2013). As a result of 
the repeal of PA 4, PA 72 temporarily went back into effect. However, five weeks after PA 4 
was repealed by popular vote, the Michigan State Legislature revised and passed a new bill, 
the Local Financial Stability and Choice Act of 2012 (Public Act 436; Mich. Comp. Laws § 
141.1541-141.1575), which retained the emergency management model of PA 4. PA 436 
was approved by the governor and went into effect in March 2013.  
 
3.2. Race, class, and emergency management: quantitative analysis  
We focus on the–time period beginning in 2008 for several reasons. This time period 
included an extended period of recovery from the 2007–2008 economic recession and the 
federal government bail out of the automotive industry. As discussed in the legislative 
chronology, this time period coincides with substantial expansion of EM powers by state 
policy makers. Furthermore, during this time period state officials made more extensive 
use of EM laws than at any other time, with 10 cities under EM, including the historic 
Detroit bankruptcy negotiations that were conducted under Detroit emergency manager 
Kevyn Orr. (see Table 1).  
We used 2010 Census data and 2009-2013 ACS data to examine race and ethnicity, 
focusing on the three largest race and ethnic groups in Michigan, and family poverty rates 
of Michigan cities that experienced emergency management intervention beginning in 
2008. Overall, as noted in Table 2, based on 2010 Census numbers, the Michigan population 
was majority non-Hispanic White (76.6%); 14% of the population was Black or African 
American, and 4.4% was Hispanic or Latino. Based on our analysis (Tables 1 and 2), 10.1% 
of all Michigan residents lived in cities that were under emergency management at some 
point from 2008 - 2013. Of the 10.1% of Michigan residents under emergency 
management, 70.7% were African American and 7.3% were Hispanic or Latino. By contrast, 
18.1% of the population under emergency management was White. Thus, both African 
American and Hispanic or Latino populations were overrepresented in cities under EM, 
whereas Whites were clearly underrepresented.  
Furthermore, as seen in Table 2, we examined how the demographic characteristics of 
those under EM compared to the state level demo- graphic profile. African Americans 
comprised 14% of Michigan's population. Yet, compared to their total representation in the 
Michigan population, 51% of African Americans in Michigan were under an emergency 
manager at some point from 2008 - 2013. The Hispanic or Latinos population comprised 
just 4.4% of the Michigan population. Yet, the His- panic or Latino population was also 
overrepresented, with 16.6% of all Michigan Hispanic or Latinos under EM at some point 
during 2008- 2013. In contrast, during the same time period, although non-Hispanic Whites 
were 76.6% of Michigan residents, only 2.4% of Whites in the state were under an 
emergency manager.  
Additionally, ACS data (5-year estimates for 2009-2013) indicated that the poverty level for 
all families in Michigan was 12%. Cities under EM laws had much higher poverty rates than 
the state as a whole (Table 1). For example, the poverty levels for families were 37.5% in 
Hamtramck, 44.8% in Benton Harbor, and 40.3% in Highland Park. Only Allen Park and 
Three Oaks had family poverty rates that were similar to or lower than the state average. 
Allen Park's financial hardship resulted not only from the historical trends previously de- 
scribed (relocation of industry, urban sprawl, decline in federal and state revenue sharing), 
but also from a “failed movie studio development project” (Williams, 2012) from which the 
small city could not recover.  
Finally, it is worth noting that, as indicated in the chronology presented in Table 1, 
numerous cities (Ecorse, Hamtramck, Highland Park, and Flint) have had more than one 
bought of emergency management. This suggests that the EM system may not effectively 
solve the problems that is intended to fix.  
 
3.3. Community organizing and emergency management: an ethnographic case study  
In Detroit, the EM law was activated in response to a severe and worsening fiscal crisis. 
According to the Detroit Free Press, following the economic recession the city had $18 
billion in liabilities; possessed 78,000 blighted buildings; and devoted 4 of every 10 dollars 
to debt, pensions, and retiree health care rather than necessary city services (Bomey, 
Gallagher, & Stryker, 2014). In March 2013, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder appointed 
Kevyn Orr as the emergency manager of Detroit. In July 2013, Detroit became the largest 
American city to declare bankruptcy when Orr filed for municipal bankruptcy in U.S. 
District Court in Detroit (no author, Detroit Free Press, 2014; Zavattaro, 2014). To 
demonstrate the mechanism through which the EM law curtails local democracy and social 
welfare provision, we present a case study of a Southwest Detroit neighborhood's 
Community Benefits Coalition campaign to promote local investment in exchange for 
hosting a new international border crossing, and how the Detroit emergency manager 
played a role in thwarting their efforts to obtain a Community Benefits Agreement, or CBA.  
Discussion of constructing a new international border crossing bridge to link the United 
States and Canada dated back to 2008, when a team of representatives from the United 
States, Canada, Michigan, and Ontario proposed to construct a new border crossing and 
interstate that would streamline growing international trade. The team acknowledged that 
the new bridge would result in environmental health impacts within its host community. 
Although it considered many host neighborhoods up and down the border, the team 
ultimately decided that the U.S. leg of the crossing would land in the heavily industrialized, 
low-income southwest Detroit neighborhood of Delray (Krings, 2015).  
Following the announcement, many residents stated that they were not surprised by the 
decision because so many other locally undesirable land uses were already placed in the 
neighborhood, including the region's wastewater treatment plant. Furthermore, they 
believed that their neighborhood was targeted because its residents are predominately 
poor racial minorities who lack political influence (Krings, Spencer, & Jimenez, 2013). 
According to the ACS 5-Year Estimates (2009–2013), 17.3% of Delray residents were Black 
or African American, 29% were of Hispanic or Latino origin, and 31% were White. 21% of 
Delray residents were foreign born. Approximately 40% of Delray households lived in 
poverty and one-third were female-headed house- holds. Furthermore, the Delray 
community is young - 29% of Delray residents are age 19 or younger. Residents of Delray 
experience some of the poorest health outcomes for children in Michigan. For example, the 
asthma rate in Southwest Detroit is three times higher than the state average, and its rate 
of preventable hospitalization among children was the highest in the city (Tanner-White & 
Lam, 2010; University of Michigan Urban and Regional Planning Program, 2007; Schlanger, 
2016).  
While some Delray residents and business owners dreamed that the new bridge would 
bring investment, others held a litany of concerns. The residents, business owners, and 
faith leaders who would be displaced by the bridge and customs plaza wondered if eminent 
domain laws would compensate them adequately and some, particularly the elderly, did 
not want to be moved. Some viewed the new bridge as an ex- ample of environment 
injustice. Residents who would stay in the neighborhood pointed to the high rates of 
childhood asthma in the neighborhood and feared that the new bridge, with its attendant 
rise in traffic, diesel emissions, and noise pollution, would harm the health of children 
whose lungs were still developing.  
Believing that it would be impossible to prevent the new crossing, community stakeholders 
organized to pursue a community benefits agreement, or CBA. CBAs typically result from a 
bargain in which a com- munity coalition agrees to support a new development in exchange 
for investment in the community (Parks & Warren, 2009). Stakeholders in the community 
learned about CBAs that were obtained in Los Angeles to mitigate harm related to the L.A. 
airport and port, for example. Thus, Delray neighborhood residents were optimistic that a 
CBA could pro- duce local investments in services for children, such as schools and health 
clinics, as well as affordable housing, access to clear and timely information, and local 
accountability relating to the project. For example, the Community Benefits Coalition 
advocated for the installation of additional air quality monitoring systems as well as an air 
conditioning system within the neighborhood's only remaining school.  
From its 2008 inception until 2012, Southwest Detroit Community Benefits Coalition 
lobbied city, state, national, and even Canadian officials for a CBA. In 2012, despite their 
efforts, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
signed an agreement to build the bridge, without specific local investments. The Com- 
munity Benefits Coalition's political leverage dwindled and the neighborhood's decline 
accelerated.  
In 2014, a new political opportunity emerged for the coalition. To build the new crossing, 
Michigan needed to purchase land that the city had obtained through tax foreclosures. 
Coalition members, in cooperation with their city council member, lobbied the Detroit 
Mayor and City Council to include a provision in the land sale that the $1.4 million sale 
price would be invested back into Delray. The Detroit City Council unanimously agreed 
with the plan and passed a bill to sell the city land, on the condition that it included local 
investments to Delray (Guillen, 2014).  
However, following the Detroit City Council's approval of the land sale, Kevyn Orr — who, 
as noted earlier, had been appointed emergency manager of Detroit in 2013 — proposed 
an alternative plan that did not include a commitment to Delray. As an emergency manager, 
Orr and his team were focused on paying down Detroit's fiscal debt. Thus, rather than 
investing in declining neighborhoods, their main interest was in paying off the city's 
creditors. Under the Michigan EM law, the actions of the Mayor and City Council were 
advisory and are not binding; ultimately, Orr was under no obligation, politically or 
otherwise, to enact the plan approved by Detroit City Council. Under the legislative 
provisions of the EM law, the emergency manager alone determines the con- tracts and 
agreements the City enters into. Ultimately, a state emergency loan board considered the 
two plans and chose the one pro- posed by Orr, justifying its decision by stating that under 
EM law, provisions could not be placed upon the sale of city assets. The Community 
Benefits Coalition and its city council member were stunned. Not only did the community 
lose the opportunity for investment through the land sale, the democratic process had been 
undermined by an unelected emergency manager who prioritized the city's credit over 
local health and wellbeing (Felton, 2014).  
In November 2014, the Detroit bankruptcy was settled in U.S. Bankruptcy Court. In 
December 2014, Kevyn Orr resigned as EM of Detroit. In 2015, when Orr officially stepped 
down and the Mayor regained authority, the Community Benefits Coalition returned to the 
City, again asking for local investment. At the time of publication, some city money has been 
invested in tearing down blighted buildings within the community and the coalition 
continues to advocate for investment through other means.  
 
4. Discussion  
The use of EM laws is increasingly widespread, but they are not well understood by 
practitioners in social service settings. In this article, we describe EM laws and their 
implementation during a period of economic distress in one Rust Belt state – Michigan. The 
purpose of this article is not to argue that fiscal intervention is or was unwarranted in cities 
governed by EM laws. Indeed, many of the cities – in Michigan and else- where – where EM 
laws have been implemented have suffered from severe, prolonged economic distress that 
deeply affected the basic functions of city government, to the detriment of the citizens in 
those areas (Zavattaro, 2014). Rather, our goal was to examine these policies from a social 
justice perspective, by showing that EM laws have a dis- proportionate impact on 
vulnerable and oppressed populations, including racial and ethnic minorities, and families 
living in poverty. We question how the continued use of EM policies may affect the ability 
of the urban poor and minorities to exert political power and, ultimately, to promote 
residents' health and wellbeing. We argue that the continued disenfranchisement of urban 
populations is a topic of central concern for social service providers working in urban 
communities with vulnerable and oppressed populations.  
Anderson (2012) argues that EM laws reflect “ ‘democratic dissolution’... changes that 
suspend local democracy, even though the city re- mains a legal entity.... [it] preserves the 
municipal corporation but suspends its government” (Anderson, 2012, pg. 581). Indeed, as 
we de- scribe in the chronology of EM law legislation, the legislative process that put the 
EM law into place in Michigan ignored the will of the citizens. When a statewide ballot 
initiative to repeal PA 4 was approved by the majority of Michigan voters, the Michigan 
State Legislature circumvented the legislative process and enacted PA 436, which retained 
the widespread powers of the emergency management process of PA 4, doing so through 
the use of an Appropriations bill which cannot be subject to repeal through statewide 
referendum. And, unlike a city mayor or city council, the governor-appointed decision-
maker is under no direct mandate to respond to local pressure. In this way, EM laws limit 
citizen input in favor of an unelected manager and his or her staff, whom, it can be argued, 
often make decisions motivated by cutting costs rather than promoting the health and 
wellbeing of residents.  
Our analyses of Census data show that EM laws disproportionally affect race and ethnic 
minority residents of urban areas with higher-than- average poverty rates. A startling 51% 
of African Americans residing in Michigan have been under the governance of EM laws at 
some point since 2008. Hispanic or Latinos were also overrepresented relative to the state 
demographic profile, with 16.6% of the Hispanic or Latino population under EM even 
though they were only 4.4% of the Michigan population. Even more shocking, in a state that 
is majority non-Hispanic White (76.6%), only 2.4% of Whites statewide were ever directly 
under the governance of an emergency manager during the same time period.  
An implication of this descriptive analysis is that a majority of African Americans in 
Michigan have been denied the local control typically available through democratically 
elected city council and mayoral authority. These data indicate that it is simply not possible 
to argue that these policies are “race neutral,” as the impact is almost exclusively borne by 
race and ethnic minority populations in Michigan. When viewed in the context of the 
legacies of racial discrimination in the U.S. (e.g., Sugrue, 2005), we must question how these 
policies serve as a structural factor contributing to continued racial inequality and the 
disenfranchisement and disempowerment of the urban poor and minorities.  
Because EM laws are intended to address fiscal crises, it may not be surprising that families 
living in poverty are also disproportionality affected by EM laws. Nonetheless, the numbers 
are again striking. Nearly all Michigan cities governed by EM laws had poverty rates for 
families that were double - and even triple - the state poverty rate for families (12%). Here 
again is evidence that the impact of EM laws are disproportionately borne by marginalized 
groups – including socioeconomically disadvantaged families – who are historically the 
least able to exert political power.  
The case study of Delray is one example of how the system of emergency management 
affects the health and wellbeing of children and families. Without the Mayor or City Council 
to advocate on their behalf, the citizens of Delray had little opportunity to leverage CBA 
investment. In the case of Delray, the CBA included community residents efforts to protect 
their children's health from the increased pollution that was likely to result from the 
placement of an international bridge crossing in their neighborhood. Despite residents' 
efforts, the EM procedures were one factor that blocked their efforts to obtain a CBA. Had 
they been successful, the CBA would have provided funds to protect children's health from 
increased pollution associated with the new international bridge crossing. We argue that 
this is one example of how the system of emergency management removed opportunities 
for democratic participation in city politics and, in so doing, limited the political power of a 
grassroots group fighting for investments in health and wellbeing.  
As noted in the introduction, another example of the impact of such policies on the health 
and wellbeing of children and families is the Flint water crisis. In an effort to save money, in 
2014 the City of Flint switched its water source from the Detroit-supplied Lake Huron 
pipeline to an alternative water source supplied by the Flint River (Hanna-Attisha et al., 
2016). The decision to switch to an alternative water source was made while Flint was 
under the leadership of an emergency manager appointed by the Michigan governor. The 
Flint emergency manager played a key role in initiating and approving the decision to 
switch to an alternative water source. Little consideration was given to protests from Flint 
City residents nor to the evidence suggesting health-related concerns resulting from the 
water source switch until a local pediatrician and her colleagues issued a report that 
documented that the blood lead levels of children in some Flint neighborhoods more than 
doubled subsequent to the water source switch (Hanna-Attisha et al., 2016). Exposure to 
environmental contaminants such as lead is likely to contribute to long-term negative 
ramifications for children's health (Hanna-Attisha et al., 2016; Trentacosta, Davis-Kean, 
Mitchell, Hyde, & Dolinoy, 2016). Lead exposure in pregnant women is also linked to fetal 
death, reduced birth weight, as well as numerous negative health and behavioral outcomes 
in young children (Hanna-Attisha et al., 2016). Additionally, a recent review describes how 
contaminants in the physical environment such as lead may alter the development of the 
growing brain, perhaps contributing to outcomes such as poorer academic outcomes and 
decreased executive functioning in young children (Trentacosta et al., 2016).  
Grassroots organizing and residents' alliances with researchers like Dr. Attisha’s report 
(2016) facilitated the documentation and dissemination of evidence relating to the dangers 
associated with the Flint water. In October 2015, after 18 months of the EM justifying his 
refusal to return to the Detroit water system by stating that it was cost prohibitive to do so, 
the governor approved the decision to switch back to the Detroit water system and, later, 
he declared a state of emergency due to the lack of clean water in the city. Despite 
international media attention and widespread concern about the health consequences of 
lead expo- sure to Flint children, the Michigan EM law remains in place.  
 
4.1. Austerity politics and the urban poor  
A larger question is whether EM laws address the underlying economic conditions that 
created the specific municipal economic crisis (Scorsone, 2014; Zavattaro, 2014). While our 
study does not address this question, we note that several Michigan cities were governed 
by EM laws multiple times, suggesting that the implementation of EM laws may not resolve 
the underlying economic and management conditions that gave rise to a fiscal “emergency” 
in the first place (Zavattaro, 2014). In terms of the distribution of public resources, rather 
than ad- dressing global political and economic systems that influence local municipalities 
and their budgets, emergency management attempts to balance budgets by curtailing local 
services – ultimately, one could argue, this mistakenly places the blame for fiscal crises on 
city residents and local government (e.g., calling out the mismanagement of funds) without 
properly acknowledging the effects of long-standing global economic trends, such as those 
noted in the introduction (e.g., relocation of jobs away from urban centers, “white flight”), 
conditions that ex- tend far beyond the control of city residents and local governments. 
Rather than hurting creditors' bottom line, emergency management offloads costs to the 
most vulnerable (Peck, 2012). Spending fields that are not defended by powerful 
constituencies or large voting blocs are especially vulnerable under such conditions, 
resulting in the default targeting of programs for the poor and marginalized. By cutting 
public services, governments do not inherently become “leaner” and “more efficient”. 
Rather, eliminating public services including schools, health clinics, streetlights, and parks, 
risks harming poor children and families and, in cases like Delray, creating a de facto 
abandonment. This culminates in fewer taxpaying residents and a deeper concentration of 
poverty. As others have noted, without a sustainable plan to address the economic health of 
urban areas with longstanding problems (Loh, 2015), it is entirely possible that cities will 
again fall into fiscal “emergencies” perpetuating the use of EM laws.  
 
4.2. Study limitations and directions for future research  
Our study is intended as a descriptive analysis of EM law implementation in one 
Midwestern Rust Belt state. Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, Ohio, and other states also have 
EM policies in place. Interstate comparative analysis of these policies is beyond the scope of 
the current article. Thus, a study limitation is that the experience in Michigan may not be 
generalizable to conditions in other states. Furthermore, this article does not make causal 
arguments; rather our analysis observes that be- ginning in 2009, EM laws were almost 
exclusively implemented in urban, majority-African American cities. Our ethnographic 
study also does not seek to make causal arguments. Because there is no counterfactual, it is 
possible that the same set of decisions that led to the abandonment of the Delray CBA 
would have been made regardless of the presence of the emergency manager. Future 
studies may wish to explore EM policies in other states and geographic locations; the 
application and implementation of EM laws or similar practices in settings other than cities, 
such as school districts; the perceptions of city residents, e.g., those who are directly 
impacted by EM laws, of the benefits and costs of emergency management laws and 
practices; and policy alternatives that do not involve the use of EM laws that would 
contribute to the fiscal stability of under-resourced urban areas.  
 
5. Conclusion  
This present article serves as a caution regarding the use of EM laws as a tool to address 
fiscal emergencies. Although it may be unintentional, these laws limit local political self-
determination and have direct implications for the health and wellbeing of low-income 
children and families—especially those living in communities of color. EM laws hinder local 
citizens' ability to meaningfully participate in decision-making that directly affects their 
wellbeing and exerts this influence on precisely the populations with the least power in 
society—that is, minorities and the urban poor. In the absence of more comprehensive 
policies to address underlying social inequalities, EM laws are unlikely to be successful in 
remedying economic distress in urban areas.  
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